9 March 1970 - Lightly revised 2002 for the West Liberty Historical Society

Introduction:  With the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in the middle of February, the whole Confederate line of defense across southern Kentucky and northern Tennessee was effectively broken.  Major-General U.S. Grant thought it was possible to accomplish further penetration without needless sacrifice of more blood.  He applied to his Department Commander, Majo-General Halleck for permission to move against Clarkseville, Tennessee.  Since no authorization was forthcoming, Grant acted on his own judgment and captured Clakesville.  About the same time, the Army of the Ohio under Major-General Buell captured Nashville, which had been vacated by Confederate general Albert Sidney Johnston’s retreat from Bowling Green, Kentucky to Murfreesboro, Tennessee.  The Confederates then attempted to put together a new line of defense along the Memphis and Chattanooga Railroad.  Major-General Leonidas Polk was forced to withdraw his Confederate Corps from Columbus, Kentucky.  It was soon evident to both sides, that Cornith, Mississippi, with its railroad junction, would be of prime importance to this second line of defense. ⁰¹

The overall situation at the end of February found the Union Armies in three areas.  Pope’s Army of the Mississippi (25,000 strong) was in southern Missouri.  Grant’s Army of the Tennessee (40,000 strong) was scattered from Fort Henry to Clarkesville.  General Buell’s Army of the Ohio (50,000 strong) was concentrated in Nashville, Tennessee.  To oppose this, the Confederates had approximately 45,000 men dispersed from the Cumberland Gap in eastern Tennessee to Memphis, on the Mississippi Rive. ⁰²  Now was the time to strike, but lack of communication between the Union generals gave the Confederates a breathing spell; which allowed them to regroup and attempt to reverse the fate of the Western Theater in Kentucky and Tennessee.

Since the middle of February, problems in communication had existed between Grant, in the field, and his commander, Halleck, in St Louis.  The telegraph line between them was incomplete, and several Dispatches disappeared along with a telegraph operator of southern sympathies.  These delays in communication caused Halleck to grow anxious.  However, Grant remained ignorant until the fourth of March when he received orders to place his command under Major-General C. F. Smith.  Grant’s suspension was the result of his apparent failure to answer Halleck’s questions as to his strength and dispositions.  This misunderstanding cannot all be blamed to Grant, since Halleck was distant from the seat of the war.  There also exists a possibility of jealousy on Halleck’s part. ⁰³  At any rate, the command of the Army of the Tennessee passed to Major-General C.F. Smith.  

Major-General Halleck then undertook to continue the task of breaking the Confederate line.  Yet, he attempted to do so from St. Louis.  He recognized the importance of Cornith and ordered Smith up the Tennessee River as far as practicable by water, with the intent of cutting the railroads running into Cornith. ⁰⁴

Prelude to the Battle: In preparation for the campaign, Brigadier-General Sherman was sent on a raid far up the Tennessee River.  On the way up, Sherman recommended that a division be debarked at Pittsburg Landing in his support.  The raid failed because of weather, and Sherman dropped back down river and joined Hurlbut’s Division, which was anchored at Pittsburg Landing.  Major-General Smith gave the order to disembark both divisions and to take positions well back, leaving room for his whole army.  It was Smith’s plan, with the approval of Halleck, that whatever force had gathered at Pittsburg Landing by mid-March would be moved on Cornith. ⁰⁵

It soon became evident that the Confederates were assembling an Army at Cornith.  To deal with this situation, Halleck ordered Buell’s Army of the Ohio to join forces with the Army of the Tennessee. ⁰⁶

In the meantime, Smith had fallen and injured himself and because of Smith’s extreme injury, Grant was restored to command on the thirteenth of March.  He had also explained satisfactorily to General Halleck his conduct after the capture of Fort Donelson.  Major-General Grant arrived at Savannah on the seventeenth and resumed command.

On or about the eighteenth of March, Brigadier-General Hurlbut disembarked his division and encamped one and a half miles inland.  The next day, he was joined by Sherman’s Division, which camped three miles in from the landing.  A few days later Grant sent the divisions of Prentiss, McClernand and W.H.L. Wallace to join Sherman and Hurlbut.  Grant himself remained at Savannah during the nights.  He put off moving his headquarters so that he could meet Buell’s Army when they arrived. ⁰⁷

Buell’s Army commenced movement on the fifteenth of March from Nashville.  On the first of April, Beneral Halleck and General Grant were notified that the Army of the Ohio would arrive in Savannah on the sixth or seventh of April. ⁰⁸

In the meantime, the Confederates had not remained idle.  General Alfred S Johnston, whose reputation had suffered with the collapse of his first line of defense, took measures to retain partial control of Tennessee.  Consulting with his second-in-command, General Beauregard, he decided to concentrate all available forces at Cornith.  Johnston’s troops arrived on the twenty-fifth of March.  Soon, other troops were brought in from Florida, Louisiana and Arkansas.  While these were concentrating, the Corps under Polk was withdrawn from Columbus and new levies were raised in Tennessee and Alabama.  In a period of four weeks, fragments of commands from Bowling Green and Columbus, Kentucky; Pensacola, Florida; Mobile, Alabama and New Orleans, Louisiana, were gathered together for the first time as an army.  Thy numbered approximately forty thousand and were all badly armed and equipped. ⁰⁹

General Johnston’s plan for the campaign “was to concentrate at Cornith and interpose his whole force in front of the great bend of the Tennessee, the natural base of the Fedral Army: this effected, to crush Grant in battle before the arrival of Buell.” ¹⁰  The planned movement on Pittsburg Landing was delayed ten days or until the second of April because of the lack of General officers and the need of reorganization.  In the reorganization, Beauregard was given general control over the whole Army, which was divided as follows:  I Corps, Major-General Leonidas Polk; II Corps, Major-General braxton Bragg; III Corps, Major-General William J Hardee; Reserve Corps, Brigadier-General John C Breckinridge. ¹¹  

On the second of April, General Johnston received word that Buell's Army of the Ohio was getting close to Pittsburg Landing.  Johnston decided now was the time to strake a decisive blow.  Accordingly, orders were given in the early hours of the third, for the march on Pittsburg Landing. ¹²  By the time the troops received the orders, it was late afternoon.  Preparations were hasty and some troops were issued their arms for the first time.  Hardee's II Corps was the first off and it arrived within four or five miles of Pittsburg Landing on the morning of the fourth of April.  The other Corps were detained and did not move until the morning of the fourth and some as late as the morning of the fifth.  All of the troops were impeded by heavey road conditions and bad weather. ¹³

The Battle of Shiloh: The general plan of Johnston was to attack the Federals in columns of Corps and to crush Grant by rolling up his left flank, cut him off from the river and then crush him against the Owl and Snake creeks, which were not easily crossed.  With that done, he possibly intended to contend with Buell for the possession of Tennessee and Kentucky.  General Beauregard seems to have held a slightly different notion.  He evidently did not appreciate the necessity of complete victory and contemplated a reconnaissance in force. ¹⁴  The plan called for the attack to begin at three o’clock on the morning of the fifth.  However, a traffic jam occurred at Mickey, several miles south of Shiloh Church.  The plan to march twenty miles and launch an attack in two days certainly seemed feasible.  However, none of the troops were conditioned for long marches, and the weather did not co-operate. ¹⁵

At daylight on the fifth, Hardee moved to within two miles of Shiloh Church and formed in line of battle.  Gladen’s Brigade joined him.  By seven o’clock Bragg’s Corps had formed the second line, with the exception of one division. The rest of the day was spent in search of the missing troops and in getting them into position.  The line of battle was not complete until four o’clock in the afternoon.  By this time, Beauregard began to waver, thinking the Union would be alerted to their presence.  Johnston insisted upon attacking the following morning.  The Confederate Army bivouacked within two miles of the Union Army of the Tennessee.  The Confederate positions were as follows:  Hardee’s III Corps formed the first line of battle, with one of Bragg’s Brigades to fill out the line; Bragg’s II Corps formed the second line and the Reserves under Breckinridge and the I Corps under Polk formed the third line. ¹⁶  

Esposito, Vincent J. editor, The West Point Atlas of American Wars 1689-1900, (NY: Praeger, 1959), I,  a portion of map 31.  

As yet, the Union forces were ignorant of the Con-federate presence. Train-ing continued and the troops enjoyed the com-parative ease of camp life.  Their forces were disposed as follows: Gen Sherman’s  Division  of new  men  was on the western right; supporting him behind was  General

McClernand’s veterans of Fort Donelson; beyond McClernand lay the camps of Gen Prentiss’ Division and on the extreme left one of Sherman’s brigades under Stuart; to the rear were the Divisons of Generals Hurlbut and C.F. Smith.  Gen Lew Wallace was camped with his veteran Division at Crump’s Landing several miles down river.  Grant’s forces were encamped in accordance with the principles of the day in line of battle.  Prentiss’ Division, which was the newest, was camped on the most exposed point. ¹⁷

On the eve of the battle, the Union Army was riding high on its recent success against Forts Henry and Donelson.  Neither Grant nor Sherman suspected an attack from the Rebels.  The general impression of being the aggressor, coupled with the continual skirmishing along the line, lulled the commanders into a false sense of security.  Several reconnaissance parties had been led by Sherman, and during one of them, Rebel artillery had been encountered.  However, Sherman dismissed it as only a battery of Horse Artillery engaged in a screening action. ¹⁸

The first warning of an attack came on the fourth of April when a rebel soldier was captured.  He claimed that he was part of a great army marching to destroy the Army of Tennessee.  Then on the sixth, at three in the morning, Colonel Peabody of Prentiss’ Division sent out a patrol which engaged the enemy and gave some warning to the slumbering camps. ¹⁹  In Sherman’s camp a private remarked “There was no mistaking that sound.  That was not a squad of pickets emptying their guns on being relieved from duty …” ²⁰

Then, Hardee’s men burst out of the woods at sun-up and the Federals turned out into their company streets from their tents to fight.  At four o’clock, the pickets of the 53^rd Ohio Volunteer Infantry were driven in and a courier dispatched to Sherman.  This Regiment lined up in battle formation for the first time.  It had never had a Battalion Drill, it had only been organized a little over a month and the men had been issued their weapons only the week before.  The camp of the 53^rd was somewhat isolated from the main body and was the first to get hit by the enemy.  The Colonel of the Regiment promptly deserted.  This served as in inspiration to his men, who barely blunted the attack before it struck the rest of the Brigade.  The panic spread and soon most of one brigade of Sherman’s Division had dissolved. ²¹

This sacrifice enabled the rest of the division to form.  About eight o’clock, Sherman finally became convinced that a full scale attack was in progress.  The Confederate assault was so vigorous that the first line of tents soon fell into their hands.  The attack had begun on the Union right and soon the whle line was engaged.  By noon Sherman was forced back behind the Purdy-Hamburg road. ²²  On the left, Stuart’s Brigade was forced back into line with Hurlbut’s and W.H.L. Wallace’s Divisions, which had been called forward piecemeal.  On this line, Prentiss was able to rally about a thousand of his men in the vicinity of the Hornet’s Nest.  This line was held until about four o’clock. ²³

Esposito, Vincent J. editor, The West Point Atlas of American Wars 1689-1900, (NY: Praeger, 1959), I, a portion of  map 35.  

Instead of the Union left flank being rolled up as planned, their whole line had been pushed back by the attack.  Johnston had left the general direction of the battle to Beauregard and had gone off to the right to lead the troops personnaly.  Beauregard seems to have exploited holes all along the line and on the Union right.  In this manner, most of the reserves were used up. ²⁴  The Rebels beat upon “the Federal front and right flank with the regular and ponerous pulsations of some great engine, and these assaults resulted in a crumbling process which was continually but slowly going on, as Regiment and Brigade and Division yielded to the continuous and successive blows.” ²⁵

Prenticss’ Division, which retired to the area called the Hornet’s Nest, attracted all nearby Rebel units which should have pressed the attack on other Divisions.  For five hours the Hornet’s Nest was continuously assaulted.  No progress was made until its flanks were turned about four o’clock. ²⁶

Meanwhile, Johnston had pushed Chalmer’s Brigade to his right front as far as the river.  He then led several attacks on Hurlbut’s Division, who was forced back as a result.  About two-thirty, the Union left was in retreat.  At this crucial point, Johnston was killed. His plan had almost succeeded.  Instead of exploiting the breakthrough owever, his troops were drawn towards the center, where the rear of the Hornet’s Nest tempted them. ²⁷

Approximately at the same time, Sherman and McClernand withdrew to positions covering the Hamburg-Savannah Road.  This movement allowed Hardee and Polk to swing their forces against the right rear of the Hornet’s Nest.  Parts of W.H.L. Wallace’s troops and Prentiss’ Division were cut off.  Resistance lasted until five-thirty.  This served to gain much valuable time for the rest of Grant’s forces. ²⁸

During the lull, when the surrounded troops were disarmed and marched to the rear, Colonel Webster of Grant’s staff assembled fifty cannon and four thousand troops on the last ridge in front of Pittsburg Landing.  After Prentiss’ surrender, Bragg was eager to continue the assault on the left.  But the lack of fresh reserves and ammunition doomed the attempt to failure.  Chalmers and Jackson made an assault at six o’clock, but were repulsed.  Beauregard then issued orders to withdraw to the Union camps for regrouping. ²⁹

As the fury abatted on the Union left, Ammen’s Brigade of Nelson’s Division of Buell’s Army, arrived on the field, but did not exert too much influence on the Rebel repulse.  After the fighting died down, more reinforcements arrived.  Lew Wallace arrived after a whole day spent in marching.  The same was true of Nelson’s Division.

The condition of the Army of the Tennessee at sunset was far different than that of the morning.  Many of the raw recruits had become veterans, many were dead, and more were cowering in fear below the bluff.  On the Union right, Lew Wallace’s Division numbered 5,000 fresh men.  Next came fragements of Sherman’s Division numbering not more than a thousand.  Then came McClernand’s Division, which had maintained most of its formations, but was still worn.  It numbered 1,500 men.  Following was Hurlbut’s, which amazingly had about 2,000 men fairly well organized.  About 2,000 more from W.H.L. Wallace’s Division and other scattered commands were in the rear of these lines.  Of the original force of approximately 37,000, only 7,000 were still in line.  To these must be added Wallace’s 5,000.  Of the rest, 7,000 were either dead or wounded, 3,000 captured and the rest in hiding along the river. ³⁰

“It was a spectacle of complete defeat, any ordinary General would have settled for saving the rest of his army by retreat.  But Grant was no ordinary general.  Reinforced by the van of Buell’s Army of the Ohio and aby Lew Wallace’s Division, he counter attacked Monday Morning.” ³¹

In the pitiful condition described, the Army spent the night.  The difficulties of their slumber were enhanced by the lack of tents, rations and an obliging cloudburst.  No matter, their salvation was at hand in the form of the Army of the Ohio.  During the night, Grant’s force was doubled by the addition of three divisions of that Army.  General Grant is reported to have told Sherman that “he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win.” ³²

In the morning, Buell and Grant attacked independently all along the line and found the Confederates widely scattered and intermingled with no fresh reserves to counter Buell’s troops.  The Rebs were hard put to dispose 20,000 men on the line.  They too had problems with stragglers.  Most of the morning, the Federal advance was somewhat diputed.  Then about noon, Beauregard decided to withdraw. ³³  By two-thirty the withdrawal was well in hand and by four o’clock the Confederate Army was behind the rear guard composed of Breckinridge’s troops.  Coincident with this, the Union troops reached their line of camps and their aggressive spirit quickly dissipated.  No immediate pursuit of the enemy was organized.  Indeed, the condition of the troops, supply and muddy road practically prevented any pursuit. ³⁴

In the April ninth issue of the New York Times, the battle was described as one of the hardest ever fought on the North American continent.  Estimates of losses in the following issues varied from high to low.  In all probability, about twenty-five per cent of both armies engaged were killed, wounded or missing in action; approximately 13,000 casualities were suffered by the Union, and another 10,000 by the Confederates. ³⁵

By the eight of April the outcome of the campaign was clear.  With the conjunction of both Union armies, Cornith must fall.  The opportunity to destroy the Confederate Army was wasted by Halleck, who assumed supreme command in the field.  His advance upon Cornith must be credited with caution and economy of forces. ³⁶

Conclusion: With the battle narrative completed, it would be well to consider some of the mistakes of both sides and look at other contributing factors to the final outcome of the battle. 

First, let us consider the state of training and discipline in both armies.  In each army there was widespread insubordination, a marked tendency towards disobedience, and a high rate of desertion, which sometimes seemed larger because of the prevalent straggling.  The American soldier of the period saw no reason for observing discipline when not in battle.  Thus, discipline in the volunteer units, which elected their own officers, resembled a town meeting.  And like a twon meeting, many did not regard their continued attendance compulsory.  On the march and in battle, large numbers were dribbled away for the purposes of satisfying hunger, thirst or the desire to help a wounded comrade to the rear.  Then too, there were the sightseers who drifted over to the next hill or regiment to find out what was going on.  This tendency easily explains the large number of men in the rear of both armies. ³⁷

A second point which influenced the outcome of the battle, was the general lay of the land at Shiloh.  The area was wooded and broken by many streams, which afforded excellent defensive positions.  To some, it was thought that the large streams on both flanks were a hindrance and to others, a blessing.  There was also marked disagreement as to the wisdom of concentrating the Army of the Tennessee on the west side of the Tennessee River.  The New York Times commented in its 11 April, 1862 issue that “It was never designed that it (the Army) should be on any other side of the River.  That the enemy attempted to drive it (the Army) ito the river is no proof that the wrong side had been selected.”  ³⁸  The outcome of the battle settled the question as to whether the position could be held.

One controversy that has grown out of the Union position, concerns the Federal failure to properly entrench the site.  The main reason behind this failure was that “… field fortifications were not highly esteemed by veterans of the Mexican War, who – having stormed many of them – felt that they merely reduced the fighting spirit of the troops behind them.” ³⁹  Of a more serious nature, was the failure on the part of the Federal commanders to make proper arrangements for picket lines and reconnaissance.  ⁴⁰

On the Confederate side, the most glaring inadequacy was the disposition of the Corps in battle order.  No one officer was in complete charge of a section of the line. ⁴¹  Also of some importance, was the division of command between Beauregard and Johnston.  General Johnston had planned to drive Grant’s Army against Owl Creek.  However, Beauregard drove the Union lines too far to allow this. ⁴² Despite the foul-ups, the plan came close to success.  If an adequate reserve had been provided, or if the bulk of the forces had been assembled near Lick Creek, the Plan’s success would have almost been assured. ⁴³   As it was, Beauregard’s idea of re-equipping the Rebel Army at Federal expense, was defeated by stout resistance.  Johnston’s plan of a decisive victory was defeated by inaction. ⁴⁴

This brings us to the close of the first day.  The activities of the second day lend themselves less to criticism.  The most blatant fault seems to be in the lack of an immediate pursuit of the retiring Rebel forces.  Grant, himself admits that “an immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns.” ⁴⁵

Throughout the whole battle, these salient points stand out:

1. Nowhere was the Union line decisively and overwhelmingly defeated.

2. The failure of the South to provide adequate reserves, did not allow them to exploit temporary successes.

3. Large Union forces were within miles of the battlefield to relieve the Union Army if necessary.   

General Johnston delt his cards, gambled, and lost. ⁴⁶  The battle, more than anything else, pointed out to both sides that the contest would not end with several campaigns.  After the battle both contestants girded for a longer war. ⁴⁷