BELGIAN ARMED RESISTANCE

Forsythe, Max A. "Belgian Neutrality in 1914", (Ada: ONU, 1970)

A treaty incorporating Twenty-four Articles for the separation of Holland and Belgium was ratified by Austria, France, Britain, Prussia, Russia and Belgium on the 31st of January 1832. One article of this treaty imposed neutrality upon the new kingdom. By the very nature of the treaty, the Belgians were forbidden to plan with any other nation for the possibility of war. Since their independence, the Belgians had spent their energies in fraternal fighting between Catholics and Protestants, Flemings and Walloons, and in disputes over Socialism and French and Flemish bilingualism. Their one desire was to be left in this happy condition. In the intervening years down to 1914, the nation had not been involved in any of the European squabbles. As a result the Belgians had grown complacent about their duty to protect their neutrality and their defenses had remained embryonic. Indeed, any action that implied lack of confidence in the protective treaty had been avoided. Despite these handicaps, the Belgians were able to contribute significantly to the allied war effort in 1914. ¹

Picture of Fortifications ²

A	Slope forming glacis	B	Moat
C	Infantry Trench	D	Cupola w/disappearing gun
E	Infantry Trench	F	Underground entrance
G	Munition Vaults, Barracks	H	Terra Firma

During the late 19th century, the Belgians went to great expense and trouble to construct and later extend and modernize a system of fortifications, which they hoped would serve as a deterrent to aggressors. These forts were first constructed between 1890 and 1870 and were laid out in rings around Liege, Namur and Antwerp. A special feature of the forts was the provision of semi-spherical armored cupolas for the guns, which were expected to minimize the effects of enemy shells. The guns were sited in masonry forts with earth ramparts ( see illustration above), making good targets because they stood up above the surrounding ground. This weakness was eventually realized and except for Antwerp, it was not intended that they should be defended to the last man. ³

Not until the ascension of King Albert, ⁴ was serious movement begun to modernize the forces which would occupy the forts and form the Field Army. Reforms were inaugurated and compulsory service imposed in 1913. In 1910 a General Staff had been created, but dissension among the members limited its effectiveness. It was divided into three groups. The first was composed of those who followed France in demanding an immediate offensive on the frontiers. A second was composed of those who wanted to retreat to the interior of the country to wage a defensive war. The third group composed of King Albert and General Galet wanted to compromise by waging a defensive war as close to the threatened frontier as possible without risking the lines of communication with Antwerp. ⁵ Not until the winter of 1912-1913 was a "scheme of operations (in case of invasion of Belgium from the east) worked out by General Galet." He summarized his findings thus: "The importance of what we should try to achieve varies in inverse ration to the strength of the force that the enemy puts into the field." ⁶

Up until the last moment the Belgians believed that none of their guarantors would actually violate their neutrality. But with the developments of late July 1914, the Great Powers gradually lost their complete freedom of action and the drift towards war hastened. With the imminent danger of war, the Army was put on a strengthened peace footing on the 29th, and on the 31st, the general mobilization was ordered. The 350,000 man force contemplated by the reforms could not be reached until after 1918. As a result only 200,00 men were raised. Because of the dissent in the General Staff and the strict interpretation of neutrality, the deployment of the Divisions was based upon the covering of all frontiers until the true enemy was discovered. ⁷

Map of Country & Deployment ⁸

King Albert had intended to assemble his army along the Meuse anchoring it on the fortresses, but his army was not able to execute the plan, because of the influx of untrained reservists. The mobilization had caused eight classes to be called into the field army. Each regiment had been expanded into a brigade. This arrangement increased the average age of the men in the units and broke up the already weak cohesion of the existing regiments. The inadequate body of officers and noncommissioned officers was split up amongst double the number of units. Equipment and training were inadequate, ammunition scarce, and heavy artillery completely lacking. ⁹ Beside these handicaps the soldiers "braced to their tasks unsustanied by any tradition of military courage", (Belgium never having fought a war). ¹⁰

The German mobilization which started on August 1st would take two weeks to complete the deployment of one and 1/2 million men on the Western Front. In the meantime, a special task force entered Belgium on the 3rd of August. Its mission was to carry Liege by coup-de-maitre. This force of nine brigades had been in training for years, and the attack was very carefully planned. ¹¹ However the execution was delayed by the pugnacious resistance of the Belgians. The assaults were beaten off with fearful slaughter. ¹² Only by chance did the 14th German Brigade under the guidance of Ludendorff slip into the ring of forts. The defeated Germans took revenge on the people of the neighboring villages, thus beginning the atrocities which horrified the world. ¹³ Not until the 17th of August was Liege carried, and then only because of the 305 mm and 420 mm guns which completely destroyed the Forts. By this time the Belgian Army was concentrated near Louvain on the Gette River.

With the path cleared through Liege, the Germans hurriedly pressed forward with the First and Second Armies. The Belgian Field Army was engaged and forced by sheer weight of numbers to fall back to Antwerp. Large forces had to be diverted to lay siege and watch for a possible British landing on the vulnerable flanks.

What the Belgian resistance accomplished is still being debated. Some claim that the German timetable was upset, thus contributing to the victory at the Marne. Yet the Germans contend just as strongly that their march across Belgium was exactly on schedule. However, it seems that the Belgians did hold back the flood of the Germans just long enough for the new dikes to be constructed. In a period when hours were important, the two or three day delay was decisive. ¹⁴ Perhaps just as important was the moral "advertisement to the world that the old simple faiths of country and duty could still nerve the arm for battle." ¹⁵ Even the arm of the newest untrained raw recruit:

The more solid military contributions are fourfold. First, the delay at Liege enabled the Belgian Army to gather at the Gette River, which further delayed the advance. Secondly the French Staff was permitted to introduce some important changes in their scheme of concentrations. Thirdly, the time gained permitted the British Expeditionary Force to collect and concentrate at Maubeuge. And most important of all, the Belgian Army in Antwerp tied down innumerable German units which would have been of better use at Mons, Le-Chateau, and the Marne. ¹⁶

1. Essen, Leon van der, The Invasion and the War in Belgium from Liege to the Yser, (London: Fisher Unwin, 1917), p.11; Tuchman, Barbara W., The Guns of August, (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1962), p.104f; Williams, Neville, Chronology of the Modern World 1763 to the present time, (N.Y. Mckay, 1967), p. 164.

2. Essen, Invasion and War in Belgium, p. 41

3. Barnes, R. Money, The British Army in 1914, (London: Seeley Service & Co., 1968) p. 60f

4. The background drawing by Heather Rebbin is based on a contemporary picture of the King.

5. Tuchman, The Guns of August, p. 105.

6. Galet, E.J., Albert, King of the Belgians in the Great War, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931), p. 324f.

7. Tuchman, The Guns of August, p. 100& 170; Essen, Invasion and War in Belgium, p. 41 & 45.

8. Essen, Invasion and War in Belgium, p. 46; Hammond & Co., New World Atlas & Gazetteer, (Chicago: Sears Roebuck & Co., 1954), p. 15; Avalon Hill Co, 1914 Battle Manual, (Baltimore: Avalon Hill, 1968), p. 27 & Mobilization Chart.

9. Galet, Albert, King of the Belgians, p. 73; Marshall, S.L.A., The American Heritage History of World War I, (N.Y.: Dell, 1966)., p. 68; Esposito, Vincent J. Editor, The West Point Atlas of American Wars, II (N.Y.: Praegor, 1964), opposite map 4; and also Essen, Invasion and War in Belgium, p. 45f.

10. Marshall, American Heritage History WWI, p. 68.

11. Tuchman, The Guns of August, p. 165.

12. Essen, Invasion and War in Belgium, p. 73; states that the Germans admitted to 42,712 casualties take Liege, which to me sounds exaggerated. Without further proof however, it is admitted that casualties were extremely heavy.

13. Ibid., p. 59; Esposito, West Point Atlas, opp map 4; Marshall, American Heritage Hist. WWI,p. 67.

14. Esposito, West Point Atlas, opposite map 4.

15. Essen, Invasion and War in Belgium, p. 99.

16. Ibid., p. 98; Marshall, American Heritage Hist WWI, p. 70.